We report a series of experiments on social problem solving in chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes. In each experiment a subordinate and a dominant individual were put into competition over two pieces of food. In all experiments dominants obtained virtually all of the foods to which they had good visual and physical access. However, subordinates were successful quite often in three situations in which they had better visual access to the food than the dominant, for example, when the food was positioned so that only the subordinate (and not the dominant) could see it. In some cases, the subordinate might have been monitoring the behaviour of the dominant directly and simply avoided the food that the dominant was moving towards (which just happened to be the one it could see). In other cases, however, we ruled out this possibility by giving subordinates a small headstart and forcing them to make their choice (to go to the food that both competitors could see, or the food that only they could see) before the dominant was released into the area. Together with other recent studies, the present investigation suggests that chimpanzees know what conspecifics can and cannot see, and, furthermore, that they use this knowledge to devise effective social-cognitive strategies in naturally occurring food competition situations.
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A central question in the study of primate cognition is what individuals know about the psychological processes of other individuals. Initially, for theoretical reasons, most of the research focused on what nonhuman primates know about various 'high-level' psychological processes, such as the beliefs and intentions of others. Unfortunately, this research has come to no clear consensus (see Tomasello & Call 1994 , 1997 ; Heyes 1998 for reviews). Although some researchers contend that observations of apparently deceptive behaviours in the wild are good evidence of this kind of social cognition (e.g. Byrne 1995), others point to experiments that, in general, have found either negative results (Povinelli et al. 1994 (Povinelli et al. , 1998 Call & Tomasello 1999) or positive results only after many trials in which learning could have taken place (Premack & Woodruff 1978; Woodruff & Premack 1979; Povinelli et al. 1990; but cf. Call & Tomasello 1998) . This research has also suffered from the difficulties of operationalizing elusive psychological phenomena such as beliefs and intentions.
Recently, however, a number of studies have focused on what nonhuman primates know about the relatively 'low-level' psychological process of visual perception, a process that, initially at least, is much easier to operationalize behaviourally than many of the so-called higherlevel processes. The question is simply what individuals know about the visual experience of other individuals: do they know that others see things and that this affects their behaviour in predictable ways? This understanding may take different forms, from an individual's use of the gaze direction of others as a behavioural cue to the understanding that the visual experience of others is analogous to one's own visual experience. Differences in this kind of social/psychological understanding might have significant effects on the way in which different species or individuals are able to find food, avoid predators, and monitor and predict the social interactions of groupmates.
There is now solid experimental evidence that many nonhuman primate species, especially chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, reliably follow the gaze direction of conspecifics to external targets. For example, Tomasello et al. (1998) found that five different species (P. troglodytes, Cercocebus torquatus and three species of Macaca) reliably followed the experimentally induced gaze direction of a conspecific (see also Emery et al. 1997) . One explanation for this behaviour is simply that individuals learn,
